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bombers, arsenal planes, and longrange, high-speed strike craft.
Concluding strategic recommendations
include maintaining open lines of communication with as many parties in
Asia as possible, maintaining U.S.
transparency so that U.S. objectives are
clearly understood, and expanding the
net of U.S. security partners.
This RAND outline of a comprehensive, realistic, flexible U.S. strategy in
Asia, with appropriate military reconfiguration, is an important contribution
to our search for continued stability in
this part of the world.
GRANT F. RHODE

Brookline, Massachusetts

Pollack, Kenneth M. The Threatening Storm: The
Case for Invading Iraq. New York: Random
House, 2002. 384pp. $25.95

The United States and its allies once
more stand on the brink of war with
Iraq. What makes this war different,
however, is that its primary goal is to
replace the dictatorial regime of
Saddam Hussein with a democratic
form of government. In the opinion of
the Bush administration, removal of
Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction will bring stability to the Middle East and the world. While there is
consensus to remove Saddam and destroy his weapons, there is disagreement among the experts as to how to
accomplish it. Kenneth Pollack is a specialist on Iraq whose experience as an
analyst for the Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Security
Council gives him a unique vantage
point from which to comment on U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East. In
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The Threatening Storm, Pollack posits
that a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is the
only logical means to end Saddam’s regime. This argument results from a
thorough discussion of the rise of the
current regime and of Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors and the West,
followed by a painstaking analysis of
the several options available.
In the case of Iraq, says Pollack, our vital national interest, as well as that of
the entire world, clearly lies in the economic stability of the region based on
ability to export crude oil without interference. Following the Gulf War of
1990–91, the United Nations implemented a number of measures to contain Iraqi ambitions. A short time later,
teams of weapons experts entered the
country to locate and destroy chemical
and biological weapons stockpiles and
production facilities. In 1998 Iraq threw
out the inspection teams, and for the
past four years, notes Pollack, the Iraqis
have allegedly been reacquiring chemical and biological weapons and have
reenergized their research programs to
develop nuclear weapons. Some world
leaders and strategists have proposed
five options for dealing with what they
claim is a clear and present danger to
their vital national interest in the Persian Gulf. These options are containment, deterrence, covert action, the
“Afghan” approach, and invasion.
Containment has been the policy since
the end of the Gulf War. Originally, it
had two key components: weapons inspections and economic sanctions.
With the eviction of the weapons inspectors, economic sanctions became
the sole functioning component of the
policy. The oil-for-food program and
smuggling, as well as reluctance on the
part of some allies, notably France and
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Russia, to abide by the terms of the
United Nations resolutions have served
to undermine the sanctions effort. Consequently, Saddam has been able to
acquire continuing funding for his
weapons of mass destruction programs.
Pollack maintains, therefore, that neither reimplementation of sanctions nor
unilateral imposition of sanctions by
the United States will work, because
they either do not have meaningful support from the international community
or will place the United States in conflict with its allies. In addition, sanctions would not be the most effective
way of quickly overthrowing Saddam’s
regime.
If the United States accepts the view
that Iraq should occupy a lower priority
in American policy, says Pollack, it
must choose a policy of deterrence. Pollack explains that deterrence relies on
the threat of American military action
against Iraq to ensure regional stability,
which assumes that the one deterred is
concerned about the consequences of
continuing to act uncooperatively. In
Saddam’s case, that is not a part of his
psychological profile. Pollack, therefore, rules out deterrence as a viable option, because it would leave Saddam
“free to acquire nuclear weapons” and
would be a hope against the odds that
American use of power would be sufficient to keep him in his pen. This scenario, says Pollack, is very risky and
very dangerous.
The United States has tried covert actions before with little success. Covert
actions, such as assassinations and
coups, are extremely complicated operations, and the risk of failure is high.
However, short of actually removing
Saddam from power, covert actions can
set the stage in terms of intelligence
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gathering, communications, and liaison
work for a successful change in government. However, this approach, though
useful, would also not meet the stated
objective of quickly overthrowing
Saddam’s regime.
The fourth option, the “Afghan approach,” limits the use of force to special operations troops and precision
aerial bombing. In addition, there is the
issue of using opposition forces to
accomplish the overthrow and reestablishment of government. Unfortunately,
Iraq’s opposition forces are much
weaker than, and not as well organized
as, those in Afghanistan. This option
too represents a lengthy engagement
without guarantee of success.
Each of these four options has loopholes that could leave Saddam Hussein
in power. Pollack believes that the only
real solution is an invasion of Iraq by
conventional ground and air forces.
Pollack argues his case well, going beyond the vituperative pronouncements
of the administration to link operational objectives to national strategy,
but he does not spend much time on
the reconstruction of the country,
which is, after all, the reason for invasion in the first place. He does make
two noteworthy points, however: the
removal of Saddam would allow for
withdrawal of most of U.S. forces in the
Persian Gulf region; and second, with
its wealth in oil, Iraq can pay for its
own reconstruction. Naturally, there
are advantages and disadvantages to
each option, and critics abound, but for
Pollack the question is “not whether
[we invade], but when.”
Public opinion polls may show general
support for a war in Iraq, but many
people remain doubtful of the need for
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war or for U.S. involvement. Though
this book is out to sell a policy option,
Pollack’s detailed analyses provide
readers with an excellent basis for understanding the situation in the Middle
East.
PRESTON C. RODRIGUE

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers,
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. New York:
Free Press, 2002. 288pp. $25

This is an extraordinarily timely work,
published when the United States may
be about to conduct large-scale combat
operations in the Middle East. It examines the relationship in a democracy between military and political leadership,
“or more precisely, . . . the tension between two kinds of leadership, civil and
military,” especially in time of war.
Two themes run implicitly throughout
the book. First, war is about more than
purely military considerations (Clausewitzians, rejoice!), and consequently
“war statesmanship . . . focuses at the
apex of government an array of considerations and calculations that even
those one rung down could not fully
fathom.” The resultant differing imperatives at each level explain much of the
inherent tension between civilian and
military leaders over strategy.
Second, the essence of successful wartime leadership depends crucially on
the civilian leadership’s receiving constant, reliable “truth” from its military
commanders. The hierarchical military
structure militates against delivery of
harsh facts or unpleasant news; as per
Winston Churchill, “the whole habit of
mind of a military staff is based on
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subordination of opinion.” Hence the
importance of civilian leaders constantly
asking questions, forcing military leaders
to lay bare their assumptions and explain their reasoning, because nothing
else will force the harsh but vital intellectual debate about whether military
plans actually will achieve the desired
strategic ends. Military expertise is not
decisive here; as David Ben-Gurion
noted, “In military matters, as in all
other matters of substance, experts
knowledgeable in technique don’t decide, even though their advice and
guidance is vital; rather an open mind
and a common sense are essential. And
these qualities are possessed—to a
greater or lesser degree— by any normal man.”
Citing Samuel Huntington’s classic The
Soldier and the State, Cohen describes
the “normal” theory of civil-military
relations, “which holds that the healthiest and most effective form of civilian
control of the military is that which
maximizes professionalism by isolating
soldiers from politics, and giving them
as free a hand as possible in military
matters.” This idea is widely and often
unquestioningly accepted by serving
military officers, reinforced by the apparent lessons of Vietnam, when such
tenets were held to be violated, in contrast with the successes of DESERT
STORM, when the military was ostensibly properly left alone to win the war.
Indeed, for civilians to “ask too many
questions (let alone give orders) about
tactics, particular pieces of hardware,
the design of a campaign, measures of
success, or to press too closely for the
promotion or dismissal of anything
other than the most senior officers is
meddling and interference, which is inappropriate and downright dangerous.”
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